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Abstract
Under rather general assumptions about the properties of a noisy quantum channel, a first quan-
tum protocol is proposed which allows to implement the secret bit commitment with the probability
arbitrarily close to unity.
PACS numbers: 89.70.+c, 03.65.-w
The idea that quantum physics can provide more secure communication between two distant parties
than the classical one was first put forward by Wiesner [1]. Later, after the works [2,3], a lot of papers
devoted to secret key distribution (quantum cryptography) have been published. Apart from the key
distribution protocol, there exist other cryptographic protocols which are both important for applications
and interesting in themselves. These are the so-called Bit Commitment (BC) and Coin Tossing (CT)
protocols [4,5]. Quantum versions of these protocols were first proposed by Bennett and Brassard [6].
BC is the information exchange protocol allowing two distant users A and B which do not trust each
other to implement the following scheme. User A sends some (part of) information on his secret bit b
(b = 0 or 1, commitment stage) to user B in such a way that user B cannot recover the secret bit chosen
by A on the basis of information supplied alone. However, this information should be sufficient to prevent
cheating by user A, i.e., later (at the disclosure stage) when user B asks user A to send him the rest
information on the chosen secret bit, user A should be unable to change his mind and modify the value
of his secret bit. The CT protocol is the scheme allowing two distant users which do not trust each other
to implement the procedure of drawing an honest lot.
Classical versions of these protocols are based on unproved computational complexity of some trap-
door functions which require exponentially large resources to calculate their inverse on the classical
computer [7,8].
Some time ago it was generally assumed that the quantum protocols based on the fundamental
restriction imposed by the laws of quantum mechanics rather than on the computational complexity are
unconditionally secure [9]. However, it was later shown by Mayers, Lo and Chau [10,11] that the non-
relativistic quantum BC protocol is not actually secure. User A can cheat user B without being detected
by the latter employing the so-called EPR-attack (EPR stands for Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen [12]).
The possibility of successful EPR-attack is actually based on the result of paper by Hougston, Josza, and
Wotters on the measurements performed over the quantum ensembles of composite systems [13].
All the above mentioned non-relativistic quantum protocols are only based on the properties of the
quantum states in the Hilbert space and do not explicitly contain the effects of state propagation between
the two distant users. However, actually the information transfer occurs in the Minkowski space-time.
Explicit accounting for this circumstance extends the possibilities for development of new relativistic
quantum protocols [14] and substantially simplifies the proof of their security [15]. Restrictions imposed
by the special relativity on the measurements performed on quantum states allow to realize the secure BC
and CT protocols in the ideal channel [16]. Failure of the EPR-attack in the relativistic case is related
to the impossibility of an instant modification of an extended quantum state. In addition, it is even
impossible to instantly and reliably distinguish between two orthogonal states. Restrictions imposed by
the special relativity on the measurement of quantum states were first discussed by Landau and Peierls
[17].
In the present paper we propose the first relativistic BC protocol in a quantum noisy channel. Intu-
itively, the idea behind the protocol is very simple. User A prepares (turns on the source) one of the two
orthogonal states corresponding to 0 or 1 which are sent with the maximum possible speed (the speed of
light c; further on we assume c = 1) into the communication channel as they are being formed. As long
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as the states are not fully accessible to user B, he cannot reliably determine the value of the secret bit.
User A cannot influence (again because of the existence of the maximum propagation velocity) the part
of the state which has already left his laboratory and propagates through the communication channel
(the commitment stage). When the state becomes fully accessible to user B he can reliably determine
the secret bit value (because of the orthogonality of the states) and compare it with that declared by user
A through the classical channel at the disclosure stage. Restrictions imposed by the special relativity
on quantum measurements allow to explicitly realize the original idea of the Bit Commitment protocol
on providing only a part of information on the secret bit to the other party while spatial restriction of
the state accessibility automatically results in the restriction of accessible part of the Hilbert state space
even for “internal” degrees of freedom of the quantum system (e.g., spin or polarization) since they do
not exist separately from the spatial degrees of freedom.
The protocol employs a pair of single-photon states with orthogonal polarizations and the spatial
amplitude of a special form corresponding to 0 and 1:
|ψ0,1〉 =
∫
∞
0
dkF(k)a+(k)|0〉 ⊗ |e0,1〉 =
∫
∞
0
dkF(k)|k〉 ⊗ |e0,1〉 = |F〉 ⊗ |e0,1〉, (1)
where a+(k) is the creation operator for the state with momentum (energy) k > 0, F(k) is the amplitude
in k-representation, |e0,1〉 is the polarization state, and∫
∞
0
dk|F(k)|2 = 1, [a(k), a+(k′)] = δ(k − k′), 〈ei|ej〉 = δij , i, j = 0, 1, k ∈ (0.∞). (2)
In the spatio-temporal τ -representation the states are written as
|ψ0,1〉 =
∫
∞
−∞
dτF(τ)|τ〉 ⊗ |e0,1〉, F(τ) =
∫
∞
0
dkF(k)e−ikτ , 〈k|τ〉 = e
ikτ
√
2pi
, τ = t− x, τ ∈ (−∞,∞),
(3)
where F(τ) is the amplitude in τ -representation reflecting the intuitive picture of a packet propagating
in the positive direction of x-axis with the speed of light and having the spatio-temporal shape F(τ).
The normalization condition in the τ -representation has the form [18]
〈ψ0,1|ψ0,1〉 = 〈F|F〉 =
∫
∞
−∞
∫
∞
−∞
dτdτ ′F(τ)F∗(τ ′)[1
2
δ(τ − τ ′) + i
pi
1
τ − τ ′ ] =
∫
∞
−∞
|F(τ)|2dτ, (4)
∫
∞
−∞
eikτ
1
τ + a
= ipi sgn(k)e−ika.
Important for the proposed protocol are the following two circumstances: 1) There exists a maximum
state propagation speed; 2) Orthogonal states cannot be reliably distinguished when they are not fully
accessible (even if they remain orthogonal when restricted to the domain accessible to measurements).
The classical bit values of 0 and 1 correspond to two orthogonal polarization states |e0〉 and |e1〉. Since
the polarization does not exist separately from the spatial degrees of freedom F(τ), the reliable (with
probability 1) distinguishability requires the access to the entire spatial domain where the amplitude F(τ)
is different from zero. To be more precise, any measurement in a finite domain τ necessarily involves a
non-zero error probability in the state distinguishability. Generally, any measurement is described by an
identity resolution in H [19–22,25], and when only a finite domain ∆(τ) (∆(τ) being the complement to
the entire space τ ∈ (−∞,∞)) is accessible to measurement the identity resolution has the form
I =
∫
∞
−∞
dτ |τ〉〈τ | ⊗ IC2 =
∫
∆(τ)
dτ |τ〉〈τ | ⊗ (P0 + P1) +
∫
∆(τ)
dτ |τ〉〈τ | ⊗ IC2 , P0,1 = |e0,1〉〈e0,1|, (5)
where P0,1 are the projectors to the polarization states |e0,1〉. If the measurement outcome occurs in the
accessible domain ∆(τ), the probabilities of outcomes in the two orthogonal channels P0 and P1 are
Tr{ρ(0, 1)(I(∆(τ)) ⊗ P0,1)} =
∫
∆(τ)
dτ |F(τ)|2 = N(∆(τ)), Tr{ρ(0, 1)(I(∆(τ)) ⊗ P1,0)} ≡ 0, (6)
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where ρ(0, 1) = |ψ0,1〉〈ψ0,1|, and N(∆(τ)) is the fraction of outcomes in the accessible domain. The
probability of error in that case is zero because of the orthogonality of the channels pe(∆(τ)) = 0.
However, if the outcome is not obtained in the domain accessible to the measurement, the error probability
is pe(∆(τ)) = 1/2, and the fraction of these outcomes is
Tr{ρ(0, 1)
(
I(∆(τ)) ⊗ IC2
)
} =
∫
∆(τ)
dτ |F(τ)|2 = N(∆(τ)). (7)
The total error probability is
Pe = pe(∆(τ))N(∆(τ)) + pe(∆(τ))N(∆(τ)) = 0 ·N(∆(τ)) + 1
2
·N(∆(τ)) = 1
2
∫
∆(τ)
dτ |F(τ)|2 6= 0. (8)
The protocol employs the states with a special spatio-temporal amplitude corresponding to a state con-
sisting of two strongly localized and separated by an interval τ0 “halves”
F(τ) = 1√
2
[f(τ)+f(τ−τ0)],
∫ ∆τ
−∆τ
dτ |f(τ)|2 =
∫ ∆τ+τ0
−∆τ+τ0
dτ |f(τ−τ0)|2 = 1−δ, δ ≪ 1, ∆τ ≪ τ0, (9)
where δ can be chosen arbitrarily small. The amplitude f(τ) cannot possess a finite support [23], although
it can be arbitrarily strongly localized and can have a decay rate arbitrarily close to the exponential one
[23,24]. In the following we shall for brevity omit the parameter δ bearing in mind that it can be safely
made the smallest parameter in the problem. The latter means that if the accessible domain of the
space-time τ covers the interval −∆τ < τ < ∆τ+τ0, the error probability (8) is Pe = 0. On the contrary,
if only one half of the state is accessible, the error probability (8) is Pe = 1/4. In other words, this means
that reliable distinguishability of a pair of states (9) requires access to the spatio-temporal domain of size
≈ τ0 which, because of the existence of the limiting propagation speed, cannot be achieved faster than
τ0.
The input states sent by user A into the quantum communication channel are ρin(0, 1) = (|e0,1〉 ⊗
|F〉)(〈F|⊗ 〈e0,1|). Description of the quantum communication channel actually reduces to specifying the
instrument (sometimes also called “superoperator”) [19–22,25] mapping the input density matrices into
the output ones (not necessarily normalized). Any quantum communication channel defines an affine
mapping of the set of input density matrices into the set of output density matrices. Any mapping of
that kind reduces to specifying the instrument T ,
ρout(0, 1) = T [ρin(0, 1)] =
∫
∞
−∞
∫
∞
−∞
dτdτ ′ρout(τ, τ
′)|τ〉〈τ ′|⊗ρ(e0, e1) =
∞∑
i=1
λi(|ei,0,1〉⊗|ui〉)(〈ui|⊗〈ei,0,1|),
(10)
where |ui〉 =
∫
∞
−∞
dτui(τ)|τ〉 are the eigenvectors of the output density matrix operator (kernel ρout(τ, τ ′)).
Taking into account Eq. (4) one has
∫
∞
−∞
dτ ′ρout(τ, τ
′)ui(τ
′) = λiui(τ),
∫
∞
−∞
dτui(τ)u
∗
j (τ) = δij ,
∞∑
i=1
λi ≤ 1. (11)
The output polarization vectors are |ei,0,1〉 = αi,0,1|e0〉+βi,0,1|e1〉 (|αi,0,1|2+ |βi,0,1|2 = 1). Any instrument
can be presented in the form T [ρ] =
∑
i ViρV
+
i , with
∑
i ViV
+
i ≤ I [19–22] (it is sufficient here to restrict
ourselves to the discrete outcome space i). In our case this representation can be written in the form
T [. . .] =
∞∑
i=1
λi(|ei,0,1〉 ⊗ |ui〉)(〈e0,1| ⊗ 〈F|)[. . .](|F〉 ⊗ |e0,1〉)(〈ui| ⊗ 〈ei,0,1|) + T ⊥[. . .], (12)
where T ⊥[. . .] is the part of the instrument yielding identical zero on the subspace spanned by the vectors
|F〉 ⊗ |e0,1〉.
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Writing the instrument in the form of Eq. (10) we assumed that the decoherence of both basic
polarization states occurs in the same way which is true if the medium does not possess gyrotropic
properties. The latter condition is normally satisfied for optical fiber communication channels. However,
if the decoherence of the states with different polarizations occur in different ways and depends on the
spatial degrees of freedom, the following analysis can easily be extended to that case.
Since the time of preserving the secret bit is determined by the state extent (τ0) the channel length can
be arbitrary; therefore, we shall set it equal to zero without loss of generality. Actually, the specification of
the instrument is the description of the quantum communication channel just as in the classical case where
the probability distributions on the output alphabet is specified for each symbol of the input alphabet.
At the intuitive level this mapping can be understood (with some reservation) as the transformation of an
input state |ψ0,1〉 with the shape F(τ) and polarization e0,1 into one of the output states with the shape
ui(τ) and polarization ei,0,1 occurring with the probability λi. The fact that the sum of probabilities
does not exceed unit,
∑
i λi ≤ 1, can be interpreted in our case as the disappearance (absorption) of a
photon in the channel. The channel properties are determined by the functions ui(τ) and probabilities
λi which are assumed to be known from the a priori considerations (and can be found from the channel
calibration procedure). If it is possible to choose a new interval of the state halves localization at the
output Dτ such that
∀ i = 1,∞, 1
2
∫ Dτ
−Dτ
dτ |ui(τ)|2 = 1
2
− δ, 1
2
∫ Dτ+τ0
−Dτ+τ0
dτ |ui(τ)|2 = 1
2
− δ, Dτ ≪ τ0, (13)
where δ, just as previously (9), is arbitrarily small, the channel is suitable to the realization of the
proposed protocol. In other words, the channel has the property that the strongly localized states at the
input still remain strongly localized at the output to within Dτ ≪ τ0 and Dτ > ∆τ (fig.1), although they
can change their shape and polarization. The quantity Dτ then determines the accuracy with which user
B can detect the delay of choice of secret bit by user A (delay of sending the state in the communication
channel). The probability of detecting a state at the output by user B in the spatio-temporal window
∆(τ) covering only one of the halves ui(τ) independently of the outcome in the channels P0,1 is
Pr{∆(τ)} = Tr{T [ρin(0, 1)] (I(∆(τ) ⊗ IC2)} =
∞∑
i=1
λi
∫
∆(τ)
dτ |ui(τ)|2 ≤ (1
2
− δ)
∞∑
i=1
λi ≤ 1
2
− δ ≤ 1
2
, (14)
and can be made arbitrarily close (with the exponential accuracy by suitably choosing Dτ and τ0) to
1/2. In this case, the probability of correct identification of the state when only one half of the state is
accessible (i.e. during time interval ≈ τ0) does not exceed 1/2 · 1/2 = 1/4 (8).
Now we shall calculate the probability of error for the case when the states become fully accessible
(after the time Dτ + τ0 ≈ τ0 elapses; for the ideal communication channel the distinguishability error is
zero). If the state is fully accessible (after time ≈ τ0 since the protocol was started) the probability of an
outcome in one of the channels P0,1 is
Pr{∆(τ) + ∆(τ)} = Tr{T [ρin(0, 1)] (I(∆(τ)⊗ IC2)} =
∞∑
i=1
λi ≤ 1. (15)
The fact that Pr{∆(τ) + ∆(τ)} ≤ 1 means that not all states reach the channel output, i.e. the states
are absorbed in the channel with the probability 1−∑∞i=1 λi (formally, this is the probability for a state
to never become accessible for user B). In that case, where the measuring apparatus employed by user
B did not fire at all, he can only guess which state was actually sent, the contribution to the error
probability from these events being 1/2(1−∑∞i=1 λi). Let us now calculate the contribution to the error
probability from the events when the measuring apparatus employed by user B produced some outcome.
The measurement minimizing the polarization distinguishability error for the two “honest” input states
sent by A is given by the following identity resolution (for detail, see e.g. Ref.[26]):
∞∑
i=1
Pi ⊗ (E0 + E1) + P⊥ ⊗ IC2 = I ⊗ IC2 , Pi = |ui〉〈ui|, P⊥ = I −
∞∑
i=1
Pi, (16)
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E0 + E1 = IC2 , E0 = |e˜0〉〈e˜0|, IC2 = |e0〉〈e0|+ |e1〉〈e1|, (17)
where |e˜0〉 are the eigenvectors of the operator
Γ = γ00|e0〉〈e0|+ γ01|e0〉〈e1|+ γ10|e1〉〈e0|+ γ11|e1〉〈e1|, (18)
γ00 =
1
2
∞∑
i=1
λi(|αi,1|2 − |αi,0|2), γ11 = 1
2
∞∑
i=1
λi(|βi,1|2 − |βi,0|2),
γ01 =
1
2
∞∑
i=1
λi(αi,1β
∗
i,0 − αi,0β∗i,1), γ10 = γ∗01. (19)
Taking into account Eq. (18) and bearing in mind that the states 0 and 1 are chosen by user A with
equal a priori probabilities of 1/2, the total error for distinguishing between the polarizations of the two
“honest” input states when they are fully accessible can be represented as
Pe =
1
2
(1−
∞∑
i=1
λi)+
1
2
Tr{T [ρin(0)]((
∞∑
i=1
Pi)⊗E1)}+ 1
2
Tr{T [ρin(1)]((
∞∑
i=1
Pi)⊗E0)} = 1
2
−|γ2| < 1
2
, (20)
where γ2 is the negative eigenvalue of the operator Γ in Eq. (18),
γ2 =
1
2
(γ00 + γ11)− 1
2
√
(γ00 − γ11)2 + 4|γ01|2. (21)
If the polarizations |e0〉 are |e1〉 disturbed in the channel in the same way, one has γ2 = −|γ01|. For the
ideal channel Eqs. (18–20) yield Pe = 0.
The protocol consist of the following steps. 1) The users control only their local neighbourhoods.
They agree in advance on the time when the protocol is started, the states (F(τ)) employed, and the
adopted polarization basis |e0,1〉) for 0 and 1. 2) User A encodes the secret bit b (0 or 1) as the parity
bit of N states 0˜ and 1˜ consisting of the blocks each containing k bits (b =
∑N
j=1⊕a[i, j], i = 1..k; all
a[i, j] belonging to the same block are identical) and sends k ·N states randomly distributed among k ·N
quantum communication channels. User B performs measurements described by Eq. (16). 3) At the
disclosure stage, at any time −∆τ < τ < ∆τ + τ0, user B can ask user A to announce through a classical
communication channel what he actually sent to user B. 4) After the protocol duration time elapses,
user B compares the outcomes of his measurements with the data obtained from user A through the
classical communication channel. 5) If all the tests are successful, the protocol is completed; otherwise it
is aborted.
Before the protocol duration time elapses completely, the probability of correct secret bit identification
by user B exceeds 1/2 (i.e. the probability of simple guessing) by only an exponentially small amount.
Indeed, if the block representation of 0 and 1 is adopted, the number of binary strings of length k ·N is
(see Ref.[27] for the details of summation)
Nodd = Neven =
1
2
N∑
m=0
Cm·kN ·k =
2N ·k
2k
k∑
l=1
cosN ·k (
lpi
k
) cos (lNpi) ≈ 1
2k
2N ·k, (22)
which practically coincides with the total number of binary strings of length N · k. The Shannonn
information [28–30] of the set of block strings is (to within the rounding) the number of binary digits
required to identify the string parity,
I = log2
(
2N ·k
2k
k∑
l=1
cosN ·k (
lpi
k
) cos (lNpi)
)
≈ η N · k, η ≈ 1, (23)
i.e. one should know almost all bits in the string. However, if only one half of the state is accessible
(∆τ < τ < ∆τ + τ0), the error probability for determination of any particular bit in the string is not
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less than 1/4 even in a noiseless channel (see Eq. (8)). Therefore, the probability for user B to learn the
parity bit before the protocol duration time completely elapses does not exceed
P (parity) =
1
2
+ 2−
η
2
N ·k. (24)
We shall now calculate the probability of correct identification of the parity bit after the protocol duration
time fully elapsed. The block representation with k bits is stable (the errors are corrected by majority
voting), if the number of errors in each block does not exceed k/2 − 1. The probability of wrong
identification of a block-wise 0˜ or 1˜ is
Pe(k) =
k∑
i=k/2
CikP
i
e(1− Pe)k−i ≈
√
2
pik
[2
√
Pe(1− Pe)]k, (25)
which can be made arbitrarily small by appropriate choice of k. The total error in the parity bit identi-
fication is (we assume N to be even)
Pe(parity) =
N−1∑
i=odd
CiNP
i
e(k)(1 − Pe(k))N−i, (26)
where summation is performed over the odd subscripts i only since the error in the calculated parity bit
arises when an odd number of blocks are wrongly identified. Making use of
1
2
[(x+ y)N − (x− y)N ] =
N−1∑
i=odd
CiNx
iyN−i, (27)
and substituting x = Pe(k) and y = 1− Pe(k) (x+ y = 1), one obtains
Pe(parity) =
1
2
[1− (1− 2Pe(k))N ]. (28)
By appropriate choice of k, for a specified quantum communication channel the probability Pe(k) can be
made arbitrarily small such that the quantity NPe(k)≪ 1 is exponentially small. Under these conditions
the probability of wrong parity bit identification after the protocol duration time elapses is also arbitrarily
small so that the probability of correct is arbitrarily close to 1.
Let us now discuss the protocol stability against cheating by user A. Since the minimal Hemming
distance between the two block-wise strings with different parities is k (minimal number of non-coinciding
bits), alteration of the string parity requires modification of at least k bits. Since the probability of correct
identification of each block-wise 0˜ or 1˜ is not worse than 1−Pe(k)→ 1 (see Eq. (25), Pe(k) is exponentially
small), the probability of undetectable cheating by user A does not exceed this quantity.
The protocol is also stable against the delay of choice of secret bit by user A. Note that for the
“honest” non-delayed input states the probability of the outcome in the channel ⊥, P⊥ = I −
∑
∞
i=1Pi is
zero:
Pr(∆(τ) + ∆(τ)) = Tr {(T [ρin(0, 1)] + T ⊥[ρin(0, 1)])(P⊥ ⊗ IC2)} = (29)
Tr
{((∑
i
λi|αi,0,1|2Pi
)
⊗ |e0〉〈e0|+
(∑
i
λiαi,0,1β
∗
i,0,1Pi
)
⊗ |e0〉〈e1|+
(∑
i
λiβi,0,1α
∗
i,0,1Pi
)
⊗ |e1〉〈e0|+
(∑
i
λi|βi,0,1|2Pi
)
⊗ |e1〉〈e1|
)
(I −
∑
j
Pj)⊗ IC2

 = 0,
since |αi,0,1|2 + |βi,0,1|2 = 1 and PiPj = δijPi.
Any delay of the input state for more than Dτ can be detected with the probability arbitrarily close
for 1. To prove this statement, we shall need the requirements imposed on the instrument (12) by the
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special relativity (to be more precise, by the existence of the maximum propagation speed). If a strongly
localized state (in the sense that its amplitude µ(τ) satisfies the equation
∫∆τ
−∆τ dτ |µ(τ)|2 = 1− δ, δ being
exponentially small, and ∆τ → 0) is prepared at the input of an arbitrary quantum communication
channel, then this state cannot be detected at the output of the channel in time less than t = L/c (to
be more precise, the detection will take place within the time interval −∆τ + L/c ≤ t ≤ ∆τ + L/c with
probability arbitrarily close to 1, where L is the channel length). In our case the instrument (12) should
map the states prepared at the channel input at later times into the states that arise at the output also
at later times. The delay of the state amplitude leading front at the output cannot be less than its delay
at the input.
Any delayed input state can be written as (we omit the polarization degrees of freedom for brevity)
ρdelay =
∑
l
µl|µl〉〈µl|,
∑
l
µl = 1, |µl〉 =
∫
∞
−∞
dτµl(τ)|τ〉, (30)
where |µl〉 are the density matrix eigenvectors and the supports of functions µl(τ) do not overlap in the
interval Dτ with the support of the leading halves of the functions ui(τ) arising at the channel output
from the non-delayed states. At the channel output ρdelay will be transformed into the density matrix
whose eigenstates |ηk〉 have the supports which also do not overlap with the front half of ui(τ) in the
interval Dτ :
(T + T ⊥)[ρdelay ] =
∑
k
ηk|ηk〉〈ηk|,
∑
k
ηk ≤ 1, |ηk〉 =
∫
∞
−∞
dτηk(τ)|τ〉. (31)
This implies that |〈ηk|ui〉|2 ≤ 1/2 since ηk(τ) does not cover the front half of ui(τ) where half of the norm
(i.e., 1/2) of the state ui(τ) is localized.
For the delayed states the probability of the outcome in the channel
∑
i Pi < I is
Tr
{(∑
k
ηk|ηk〉〈ηk|
)(∑
i
Pi
)}
< 1, (32)
while for the non-delayed states this probability is 1. Similarly, the probability of the outcome in the
channel P⊥ = I −
∑
∞
i=1 Pi (note that for “honest” states this probability is zero) is
Tr
{(∑
k
ηk|ηk〉〈ηk|
)(
I −
∑
i
Pi
)}
= p⊥ 6= 0. (33)
The sum of probabilities for both channels is 1 if all states reach the channel output (are not absorbed,
i.e.
∑
k ηk = 1).
Possible delay in the choice of the secret bit (delay of the state) is detected through the appearance
of outcomes in the channel P⊥ with the probability p⊥. To change the parity bit, it is sufficient to delay
the states in only one block containing k bits. The probability for user A to delay k states and remain
undetected is equal to the probability of an event when all k delayed states do not give a single outcome
in the channel P⊥ thus imitating the measurements statistics for “honest” states. We have
Pcheat = (1− p⊥)k ≪ 1, (34)
which can be achieved for any specified p⊥ by choosing a sufficiently large k.
Thus, the protocol allows to realize the honest bit commitment protocol with the probability arbi-
trarily close to 1.
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